Fairness and Redistribution by Angeletos, George-Marios & Alesina, Alberto
Department of Economics 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) 
Working Paper No. 02-37 
 
 
 
Institute for Economic Research 
Harvard University 
Institute Research Working Paper No. 1983 
 
 
 
 
Fairness and Redistribution: US versus Europe 
 
 
 
 
Alberto F. Alesina 
Harvard University; CEPR; NBER 
 
George-Marios Angeletos   
Harvard University; MIT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This paper can be downloaded without charge from the 
Social Science Research Network Electronic Paper Collection at: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=346545Fairness and Redistribution:
US versus Europe∗
Alberto Alesina
Harvard University, IGIER, NBER & CEPR
George-Marios Angeletos
MIT & NBER
First draft: October 2002. Revised: January 2003
Abstract
Diﬀerent beliefs about how fair social competition is and what determines income
inequality, in￿uence the redistributive policy chosen democratically in a society. But
the composition of income in the ￿rst place depends on equilibrium tax policies. If
a society believes that individual eﬀort determines income, and that all have a right
to enjoy the fruits of their eﬀort, it will chose low redistribution and low taxes.
In equilibrium, eﬀort will be high, the role of luck limited, market outcomes will
be quite fair, and social beliefs will be self-ful￿lled. If instead a society believes
that luck, birth, connections and/or corruption determine wealth, it will tax a lot,
thus distorting allocations and making these beliefs self-sustained as well. We show
how this interaction between social beliefs and welfare policies may lead to multiple
equilibria or multiple steady states. We argue that this model can contribute to
explain US vis a vis continental European perceptions about income inequality and
choices of redistributive policies.
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February 2002. For helpful discussions and comments, we thank Daron Acemoglu, Robert Barro, Roland
Benabou, Olivier Blanchard, Peter Diamond, Glenn Ellison, Ed Glaeser, Jhon Gruber, Eliana La Ferrara,
Roberto Perotti, Thomas Philippon, Jim Poterba, Andrei Shleifer, Guido Tabellini, Ivan Werning, and
seminar participants at MIT, Warwick, Trinity College, Dublin, ECB, and IGIER Bocconi. Arnaud
Devleeschauer provided excellent research assistance. Email: aalesina@harvard.edu, angelet@mit.edu.A. Alesina and G.M. Angeletos
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
In the United States the redistribution of income from the rich to the poor is much more
limited than in continental Western Europe (￿Europe￿ in short), at least in part because
of diﬀerent perceptions about the sources of income inequality. Many more Americans
than Europeans believe that poverty is due to lack of eﬀort rather than bad luck or
￿social injustice￿. Americans perceive wealth as the outcome of individual talent, eﬀort,
and entrepreneurship; and, given that eﬀort determines success, they believe that the
poor could raise out of poverty if they really tried. Europeans instead view poverty a
trap, which unlucky people fall in. According to the World Value Survey,7 1 per cent
of Americans versus 40 per cent of Europeans believe that the poor could become rich if
they just tried hard enough; and a larger proportion of Europeans than Americans (25
per cent versus 16 per cent) believe that income and success is mostly due to luck.1 So,
who is right, the Americans who think that eﬀort determines success, or the Europeans
who think that it is mostly luck?
This paper shows that both Americans and Europeans can be correct in their beliefs
about what determines income, even if there are no intrinsic diﬀerences in economic
fundamentals between the two places. That is, in equilibrium it can be the case that
luck is more important in Europe, while eﬀort is more important in the United States,
even if preferences, technologies, and ￿nature￿ (i.e. the exogenous statistical properties of
the variables ￿luck￿, ￿talent￿, and ￿willingness to work￿) are the same in the two places.
Diﬀerent levels of government redistribution can then be the result of diﬀerent beliefs that
are unbiased and truly re￿ect the actual relative weights of luck and eﬀort in the income
distribution, beliefs that are actually self-ful￿lling.
The key element that drives our results is the idea of ￿social justice￿ or ￿fairness￿.
With these terms we capture a social preference for reducing the degree of inequality
induced by luck while rewarding individual talent and eﬀort. In this paper we assume
that a common desire for fairness is embedded in individual preferences and take these
preferences for granted; we show emprical evidence in support of this type of prefer-
ences. While we take them as given here, we can think of such preferences either as an
1For a comprehensive discussion of these points, see Alesina, Glaeser and Sacredote (2001).
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evolutionary-stable behavioral attribute,2 or as a social norm that attempts to support
a socially preferable outcome.3 For example, if individuals are risk averse and expect
uncertainty (￿luck￿) in their lives but also diﬀer in their talent, patience, or willingness to
work, all individuals will favor a social mechanism that provides insurance against luck,
but not all individuals will favor redistribution across diﬀerent levels of talent and eﬀort.
A preference for fairness may thus re￿ect a demand for social insurance ￿ insurance is,
in fact, one of the main motivations of the welfare state (e.g., Rawls, 1971). Moreover,
t ot h ee x t e n tt h a tt a l e n ta n ds k i l lr e ￿ects past investment decisions (such as education
or entrepreurship), there are eﬃciency gains in rewarding talent and skill. On the other
hand, ￿luck￿ may represent the eﬀect of corruption, rent seeking, political subversion,
theft, fraud, and the like ￿ activities that involve large private but no social bene￿ts,4 and
are naturally treated by society as ￿unjust￿.
As the socially desired level of taxation and redistribution depends on the perceived
sources of income inequality (luck versus talent and eﬀort), and the actual composition
of income in turn depends on anticipated tax and redistribution policies, two stable equi-
libria may coexist for the same ￿fundamentals￿. In the one equilibrium, taxes are high,
individuals choose to invest and/or work less, and a relative large share of total income is
due to luck, which in turn makes high redistribution and high taxation socially desirable.
In the other equilibrium, taxes are lower, eﬀort and investment in productive activities
are higher, and a larger fraction of ￿nal income is due to eﬀort rather than luck, which
in turn sustains the lower tax rates as an equilibrium. The two regimes can be ranked
in terms of aggregate welfare. Conditional on preference and ability heterogeneity, the
￿good￿ regime is unambiguously the one in which tax distortions are lower, a larger share
of total income variation is due to eﬀort rather than luck, the need for redistribution is
limited, and overall economic outcomes are more ￿fair￿. Behind a veil of ignorance, how-
ever, the high-tax regime may dominate when the variation in innate talent is suﬃciently
2See Bowles and Gintis (2000) and Sethi and Somananthan (2001) for the evolutionary origins of
reciprocity.
3Cole, Mailath and Postlewaite (1992) show that diﬀerent social norms may indeed result in diﬀerent
reduced-form preferences.
4For example, Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1991, 1993) and Angeletos and Kollintzas (1997) discuss
how corruption and rent seeking are detrimental for economic growth.
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high.
We emphasize that the observed diﬀerences in political outcomes between the two
continents could not be explained by diﬀerences in preferences. Where Americans and
Europeans diﬀerentiate most is in their perceptions about market outcomes, not in their
preferences for fairness.5 This paper explains how diﬀerent perceptions and diﬀerent poli-
cies can be consistent with the same preferences and the same fundamentals, as the result
of either diﬀerent self-ful￿lling expectations (in the benchmark static model) or diﬀerent
self-sustained histories (in the dynamic extension); or similarly how small diﬀerences in
preferences, fundamentals, or shocks may have resulted to large diﬀerences in social beliefs
and political outcomes.
The interaction of economic and political choices and the consequent multiplicity that
we identify in this paper are novel in the literature. In Piketty (1995), multiplicity orig-
inates in the inability of agents to learn the true costs and bene￿ts of redistribution.
Diﬀerent initial priors about the costs and bene￿ts of redistribution result to diﬀerent
steady-state beliefs, which support diﬀerent optimal levels of taxation. A somewhat sim-
ilar multiplicity arises in the recent work of Benabou and Tirole (2002). Diﬀerent beliefs
a r ep o s s i b l e ,n o tb e c a u s ep e o p l ea r eu n a b l et ol e a r nt h et r u t h ,b u tr a t h e rb e c a u s et h e y
￿nd it optimal to deliberately bias their own perception of the truth so as to oﬀset another
genetic bias, namely procrastination.6 In Benabou (2000), on the other hand, multiplic-
ity originates in imperfect credit and insurance markets. When inequality is low, there is
strong political support for redistribution as a way to correct for capital-market imperfec-
tions, which in turn results to high eﬃciency and low inequality; when instead inequality
5Actually, experimental studies and the evidence on charitable donations suggest that Americans are
perhaps more altruistic that Europeans, which alone would predict more rather than less redistribution
in the United States.
6Benabou and Tirole (2002) endogenize the choice of political ideology and more speci￿cally the choice
of whether to ￿believe to a just world￿. In their model, but not in ours, people suﬀer from procrastination
and lack of self control. At the same time, they have the ability to repress past experiences and thereby
distort their own beliefs regarding what are the returns to individual eﬀort. Given that the ex-post
optimal eﬀort is ineﬃciently low from an ex-ante perspective, people ￿nd it optimal ex ante to distort
their own beliefs and maintain a more ￿rosy￿ picture about the bene￿ts of eﬀort in order to ￿deceive￿
their future selves into putting more eﬀort ex post.
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is high, the rich strongly oppose redistribution, in which case low redistribution, low ef-
￿ciency and high inequality are also self-sustained. In our paper, instead, multiplicity
originates merely in the social desire to implement ￿fair￿ economic outcomes, even when
beliefs are fully rational and there are no important diﬀerences in capital markets or
other economic fundamentals. Furthermore, our focus on fairness ￿ which is motivated
by the empirical and experimental evidence we review in Section 2 ￿ is, to the best of our
knowledge, new to the public-economics literature.7
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews some evidence on
income inequality, redistributive policies, and social preferences, which justi￿es our mod-
elling approach. Section 3 introduces the basic static model. Section 4 analyzes the
interaction of economic and voting choices and derives the two regimes as multiple static
equilibria. Section 5 introduces dynamics and derives the two regimes as multiple steady
states. Section 6 concludes. Throughout the main text, we model ￿luck￿ as exogenous
noise; in the Appendix, we consider how ￿luck￿ can be reinterpreted in terms of socially
unworthy activities.
2 Evidence on Inequality, Redistribution and Fair-
ness
2.1 Income inequality and redistribution
After-tax income is inequality is much higher in the United States than in Europe. This
fact, however, re￿ects partly the diﬀerent levels of redistribution. What really matters for
the politics of redistribution is the variance and skewness of the pre-tax income distribu-
tion. According to the data set by Deiniger and Squire (1996), in the mid nineties the Gini
coeﬃcient for pre-tax income in the United States was 38.5 versus an average of about 29
in Europe. Indirect measures of pre-tax income inequality, such as wage dispersion, skill
premia, and returns to education, reveal a similar picture. In overall, before-tax income
in the United States has both higher variance and more skewness. As for poverty, the
7Complementary is also the evidence on the role of fairness concerns in labor relations (Kahneman,
Knetsch, and Thaler, 1986, Agell and Lundborg, 1995, Bewley, 1999).
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fraction of population that receives income less than half of the country￿s median level is
about 3 times higher in the United States than in continental Europe.8
Redistributive eﬀort and support for the poor, on the other hand, is much lower in the
United States than in Europe. This is evident in both the revenue and the expenditure
side of the government budget. Income taxation is more progressive in Europe, and
the tax burden of the rich is relatively lower in the United States.9 The overall size
of government is about 50 per cent larger in Continental Europe than in the United
States (about 55 versus 30 per cent of GDP). Table 1 summarizes the composition of
government spending in Europe and the United States, using data from the OECD. The
largest diﬀerence is indeed in transfers and other social bene￿ts, where Europeans spend
about twice as much as Americans. Table 2 summarizes ￿social spending￿, as measured
by the OECD. According to this measure as well, continental European countries spend
about twice as much the United States.10 Note that a large fraction of transfer to families
is pensions with pay-as-you-go systems, which imply a redistribution from the young to
the old. However, as documented by Alesina and Glaeser (2003), the poor retirees receive
proportionally more than the rich, and the rich-poor redistributive role of pensions is
much larger in Europe than in the United States. Interestingly, there is one category in
which Americans spend just as much as Europeans, namely health bene￿ts.
An important dimension of redistribution is legislation, and in particular the regula-
tion of labor and product markets. Nickell and Layard (1999) report that the minimum
wage is 39 per cent of the average wage in the United States, whereas it is 53 per cent in
the European Union. Table 3, which is reproduced from Alesina, Glaeser and Sacerdote
(2001), summarizes the large diﬀerence in employment protection and other labor-market
regulation, using data again from Nickel and Layard (1999) and Nickel (1997). We note
that Europeans and Americans diﬀerentiate by a factor of ￿ve in the duration of un-
employment bene￿ts, but not in the replacement ratio; that is, Americans appear to be
protected relatively well against short-term unemployment, but not against long-term
8In the 1980s, that number was 18 per cent in the United States versus 5 to 8 percent in Europe. See
Atkinson (1995) for more details.
9For more details, see Alesina, Glaeser and Sacerdote (2001).
10Note that the two measures of social spending in table 2 and of transfers in table 1 are not supposed
to coincide because they come from tow diﬀerent types of classi￿cation.
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unemployment.
T h el a s to b s e r v a t i o na n dt h ep o i n to nh e a l t hb e n e ￿ts suggest that in the United
States there are many programs designed to help certain characteristics of an indigent
family, such as disease, disability, number of children, or short-term unemployment, but
there are very few programs to help those who are poor per se. Using evidence from the
Luxembourg income study, Alesina and Glaeser (2003) indeed show that the poor are
generally more protected in Europe, but the diﬀerence between Europe and the United
States is more limited in cases were clearly identi￿able sources of poverty are evident, like
disease, children to support, etc. Evidence on tax systems and the regulatory environment
con￿rm that European countries try to protect those who are poor per se more than the
United States.11 An observation which goes in the same direction is that Americans
contribute much more than Europeans to charitable contributions. One interpretation
is that they prefer to give to charities rather than being taxed because with a private
redistributive channel one can better choose the deserving recipients.12
2.2 Social mobility and redistribution
As noted above, most Americans believe that the poor have a fair chance of getting out of
poverty, while Europeans believe that they are stuck in poverty. According to the World
Values Survey,7 1 per cent of Americans versus 40 per cent of Europeans believe that the
poor have a chance of escaping poverty if they tried hard. In other words, Americans
believe that social mobility depends on eﬀort much more than what Europeans believe
for their own society.
The probability of upward mobility is likely to be taken into consideration by individ-
uals when ranking redistributive policies (e.g., Benabou and Ok, 2001). The relationship
between social mobility and individual demand for redistribution is studied by Ravallion
and Lokshin (2000) on Russian data, by Corneo and Gruner (2002) using an international
survey on several OECD countries, and by Corneo (2001) for Germany and the United
11Whether or not certain types of regulation do in fact protect the very poor or certain categories which
are overprotected minorities is an important issue which we do not explore here.
12See Alesina, Glaeser and Sacerdote (2001) for data and more discussion.
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States.13 All these papers use cross-sectional data containing both the respondents￿ opin-
ion on the desirability of redistributive policies and their self-assessments about their
likelihood of being upwardly mobile, and they conclude that the latter signi￿cantly aﬀect
attitudes towards redistribution. Alesina and La Ferrara (2001) study the eﬀect of actual
rather than self-assessed mobility on individual preferences, and they ￿nd that individuals
who live in more mobile places or times, are more averse to redistribution.
The question remains of how in fact social mobility compare on the two sides of
the Atlantic. Measuring social mobility, and especially comparing measures across coun-
tries, is extremely diﬃcult. A recent survey by Fields and Ok (1999) ￿nds that the
evidence regarding observed social mobility in the United States and Europe is incon-
clusive, even though in most estimates the United States is slightly more mobile than
Europe. Gottshalck and Spolaore (2002) note that there is a diﬀerences between the pos-
sibility and availability of means of social mobility and the actual observation of how much
people move in the social ladder. They argue that social mobility between the middle
class and the upper class is slightly higher in the United States than in Germany but the
diﬀerences are quantitatively small. Looking at educational attainment, Checchi, Ichino
and Rustichini (1999) ￿nd that the United States is more mobile than Italy, despite an
education system that, on paper, should be more egalitarian in Italy.
In any event, the diﬀerence in social mobility across the two continents is much lower
than the diﬀerence in inequality. Therefore, it seems rather implausible that it could help
explain the dramatic diﬀerence in political outcomes. What is more, social mobility is
itself an endogenous outcome and thus may not be used as an explanatory variable. In
fact, measured social mobility re￿ects both the eﬀect of luck and the eﬀect of ability,
eﬀort, and investment (either own or parental). As higher taxation distorts the incentives
for eﬀort and investment, it might be that social mobility is lower in Europe because
redistributive eﬀort is higher, not the other way round. In our model, taxation and
mobility are both endogenous, and the relation between the two can be ambiguous, as it
d e p e n d so nw h e t h e rm o b i l i t yi sd r i v e nm o s t l yb yl u c ko rm o s t l yb ye ﬀo r t . A n di nt h e
13In the paper by Corneo and Gruner (2002), other motivations of the demand for redistribution, along
with the political-economic channel, are taken into account, and the results are shown to diﬀer between
Eastern and Western European countries.
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data, the decomposition of measured social mobility to ￿luck￿ and ￿eﬀort￿ components
remains an open question.
2.3 Experimental evidence on fairness
The key assumption for our results is that agents have a desire for ￿social justice￿ and
￿fair￿ outcomes; they demand that individual eﬀort is rewarded by society; and they
expect the government to intervene and ￿correct￿ economic outcomes when they feel that
social competition is ￿unfair￿.
Fehr and Schmidt (2001) provide an extensive review of the experimental evidence on
fairness, altruism, and reciprocity. In dictator games, people give a small portion of their
endowment to others, even though they could keep it all. In ultimatum games, people
are ready to suﬀer a monetary loss themselves just to punish behavior that is considered
￿unfair￿. In gift exchange games, on the other hand, people are willing to suﬀer a loss
in order to reward actions that they perceive as generous or fair. Finally, in public good
games, cooperators tend to punish free-riders. These ￿ndings are very robust to changes
in the size of monetary stakes or the background of players. In short, there is plenty
experimental evidence that people have an innate desire for fairness, and are ready to
punish unfair behavior. What is more, the existing evidence rejects the hypothesis that
altruism takes merely the form of absolute inequity aversion. People instead appear to
desire equality relative to some reference point, namely what they consider as a ￿fair￿
outcome, which is what we assume in our model.
Further support in favor of our concept of fairness is provided by the evidence that
experimental outcomes are sensitive to whether the roles or the initial endowments of the
experimental subjects are assigned randomly or as a function of previous achievement. In
ultimatum games, Hoﬀman and Spitzer (1985) and Hoﬀman et al. (1998) ￿nd that those
who make proposals are more likely to make unequal oﬀers, and responders are less likely
to reject unequal oﬀers, when the proposers have outscored the respondents in a preceding
trivia quiz or game, and even more if they have been explicitly told that they have ￿earned￿
their roles in the ultimatum game on the basis of their preceding performance. In double
action market experiments, Ball et al. (1996) report a similar sensitivity of the division of
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surplus between buyers and sellers on whether market status is random or earned. Finally,
in a public good game where groups of people with unequal endowments vote over two
alternative contribution schemes, Clark (1998) ￿nds that members of a group are more
likely to vote for the scheme that redistributes less from the rich to the poor members of
the same group, when initial endowments depend on previous relative performance in a
general-knowledge quiz rather than been randomly assigned. In short, there is always a
con￿ict between self interest and fairness concerns, but how this con￿ict is resolved, and
whether experimental subjects regard any given inequality in ￿nal outcomes as justi￿able
or unfair, seems to depend strongly on whether such inequality derives from achievement
or random luck.
Last but not least, psychologists, sociologists and political scientists have long stressed
the importance of a sense of fairness and justice in the private, social and political life of
men. People enjoy great satisfaction when they know (or believe) that they live in a just
world, where hard work and good behavior will ultimately pay oﬀ;t h e ys t r o n g l yb e l i e v e
that one should get what he deserves and, conversely, that one should deserve whatever
he gets; they are outraged in the face of unfair behavior and they demand that justice
prevails.14
2.4 Fairness and political outcomes
It is not only experimental and psychological studies that support our modeling approach.
We now provide direct evidence on the eﬀect of fairness on political outcomes.15
The eﬀect of social beliefs about what determines income (luck or eﬀort) on actual
policy choices is not limited to a comparison of the United States versus Europe. Figure
1 shows a strong positive correlation in the cross-section of countries between the share
of social spending over GDP and the fraction of the population who think that income is
determined mostly by luck (as measured by the corrsponding fraction of the respondents to
the World Value Survey). In Table 4 we show that this correlation is robust to controlling
for the Gini coeﬃcient and continent dummies. The correlation looses signi￿cance if one
14For a detailed discussion and more references, see Lerner (1982) and Benabou and Tirole (2002).
15Complementary is also the evidence that fairness concerns aﬀect labor relations (Kahneman, Knetsch,
and Thaler, 1986, Agell and Lundborg, 1995, Bewley, 1999).
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controls for the share of the old; this is because the size of pensions depends heavily on
this variable. However, as pointed out above, the redistribution in favor of the poor old
is much larger in continental Europe than in the US; that is, the way in which pensions
are paid to the old is much more redistributive from the rich young to the poor old in
continental Europe than in the US (Alesina and Glaeser, 2003). Furthermore, as Table 5
shows, if one excludes pensions, the correlation between transfer payments and beliefs in
luck remains very strong. These tables also control for two political variables, the nature
of the electoral system and Presidential versus parliamentary regime, which may in￿uence
the size of transfers, as argued by Persson and Tabellini (2003).16
A country￿s social spending is, of course, only an aggregated measure of ￿nal outcomes,
not a direct measure of individual preferences over possible political outcomes. Such a
measure, however, is provided by the World Value Survey for a large sample of individuals
from each surveyed country. One of the questions asks the respondent whether he (she)
identi￿es himself (herself) as being on the left of the political spectrum. We take such
￿leftist political orientation￿ as a proxy for being in favor of redistribution. In Table 6,
we then regress this variable against the individual￿s own belief about what determines
income, together with a series of individual- and country-speci￿c controls. Again, the
belief that luck determines income has a large and very signi￿cant eﬀect on the probability
of being leftist.17
Further survey evidence in support of the desire for fairness is in Alesina and La Fer-
rara (2001). They use the G e n e r a lS o c i a lS u r v e yfor the United States and show that
individuals who think that income is determined by luck, connections, family history, etc.,
16The breakdown between pensions and other social spending was available only for OECD countries
in a comparable form, this is why the number of observations is diﬀerent in the two tables.
17Similar results are reported in Alesina, Glaeser and Sacerdote (2001) using the country￿s mean belief
instead of the individual￿s own belief. Income and education in￿uence negatively the probability of being
leftist; leftists tend to live in cities and have fewer children; and the oldest (above 65) are signi￿cantly
less leftist than all the other age groups. The dummy for being a US citizen allows for the possibility
that the concept of ￿left￿ and ￿right￿ might diﬀer between Europe and the United States; the results are
totally insensitive to removing that indicator variable. Relative to the speci￿cation of Alesina, Glaeser
and Sacerdote (2001), we added the Gini coeﬃcient, to control for the eﬀect of inequality per se. On the
other hand, we omitted ethnic fractionalization, because it is insigni￿cant and does not aﬀect the results.
We report Probit estimates, but OLS results are very similar.
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rather than individual eﬀort, education, ability, etc., are much more favorable to govern-
ment redistribution, even after controlling for an exhaustive set of other determinants of
preferences for redistribution. These controls include the respondent income, his gender,
marital status, race, age, various characteristics of where he or she lives, employment
status, education, personal experience of social mobility. Similar results are reported by
Fong (2002) using a diﬀerent data set for the United States.
3T h e B a s i c M o d e l
Consider a non-overlapping generation model, in which each generation consists of a large
number of agents (a [0,1] continuum), who live for two periods. In each period of life,
agents engage in investment and productive activities, such as accumulation of physical
or human capital, work, entrepreneurship, etc.. In the middle of their life, agents vote
over the tax and redistributive policy of their government. And at the end of their life,
agents consume all their disposable income. As there are no links across generations, the
economy is essentially static, and we can characterize economic conditions and outcomes in
one generation without reference to any other generation. (We consider inter-generational
links later, in Section 5.)
3.1 Heterogeneity, technologies, and preferences
The investment and productive activities of the ￿rst period of life require eﬀort. Income is
the combined outcome of inherent talent, investment during the ￿rst period of life, eﬀort
during the second period of life, and luck:
yi = Ai[αki +( 1− α)ei]+ηi. (1)
yi denotes the income agent i receives in the second period of life, ki the investment
he makes in the ￿rst period of life, and ei the eﬀort he exerts in the second period of
life.18 α ∈ [0,1] is a technological constant, which can be interpreted as the share of
18If we interpret ki as a form of human capital, ki and ei are likely to be complements; such com-
plementarities would complicate the algebra but would not matter for our results. Also, the case that
12Fairness and Redistribution
income that represents return to past investment and that is sunk when the tax rate is
￿xed. Ai represents the inherent talent and skills of agent i. Finally, ηi is i.i.d. noise,
which we interpret as pure random luck. In the Appendix, we discuss how one can
in￿uence his ￿luck￿ by engaging in ￿bad eﬀort￿, that is, how ￿luck￿ can be reinterpreted
as corruption, rent seeking, political subversion, theft, fraud, or other forms of socially
unworthy activities.
Consumption in the second period of life is given by
ci ≤ (1 − τ)yi + G. (2)
τ denotes the ￿at-rate income tax the government imposes in the second period and G
represents a lump sum transfer. This redistributive scheme is widely used in the literature
following Romer (1975) and Meltzer and Richard (1981), because it is the simplest one
to model. The qualitative nature of our message is not unduly sensitive to the precise
nature of this scheme.
Individual preferences are given by
ui = Ui(ci,k i,e i,Ω)=ci −
1
βi
ϕ(ki,e i) − γΩ. (3)
The ￿rst term represents the utility of consumption. The second term represents the costs
of ￿rst-period investment and second-period eﬀort. βi parametrizes the willingness to
postpone consumption and work hard: a low βi captures impatience or laziness, a high βi
captures ￿care for the future￿. or ￿love for work￿. If agents suﬀered from procrastination
and hyperbolic discounting, βi could also be interpreted as the degree of self control.19
For simplicity, and without serious loss of generality, we let ϕ be quadratic:
ϕ(ki,e i)=
α
2
k
2
i +
1 − α
2
e
2
i. (4)
productivity and human capital re￿ects, not only one￿s own choices during his life, but also the wealth
and history of his family, is examined in Section 5.
19In that case, we would need to distinguish between ex ante and ex post preferences. For example, we
could let βi =1for all i ex ante, whereas βi ≤ 1 and Va r(βi) > 0 ex post. Such a modi￿cation would
complicate the algebra but would not change fundamentally our equilibrium analysis. A ￿sophisticated￿
median voter would try to oﬀset the temptation to procrastinate when choosing the optimal tax rate,
which would decrease the incentive to tax, but the possibility of multiple equilibria would remain. For an
elegant model where the anticipation of procrastination aﬀects also the choice of ideology, see Benabou
and Tirole (2002).
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The coeﬃcients α/2 and (1−α)/2 are merely a normalization. Finally, Ω is a measure of
￿social injustice￿, and γ measures the strength of the social demand for ￿fairness￿. Note
that with this term we capture aversion to unfairness, not aversion to inequality.
3.2 Fairness and social injustice
Following the evidence in Section 2 that most people share a common concern for fairness
and a common perception that one should get what he deserves and deserve what he gets,
we de￿ne
Ω = E
Z
i
(ci − b ci)
2 (5)
and
b ci ≡ b yi ≡ Ai[αki +( 1− α)ei]=yi − ηi (6)
The latter represent the ￿fair￿ or ￿ideal￿ levels of consumption and income for agent i,
that is, what the agent should enjoy on the basis of his talent and eﬀort. Ω then gives an
aggregate measure of the distance between actual and fair levels of consumption in the
society. In the absence of taxation, Ω would measure how unfair is the pre-tax income
distribution; now Ω measures how unfair economic outcomes remain after redistribution.
Note that the expectation operator E appears in Ω because (Ai,βi,η i), and thus (ki,e i,b ci),
are private information to agent i. The government and the society as a whole observe
the total income of each agent, but can not tell whether this income is the fruits of talent
and eﬀort or the outcome of pure luck (or the outcome of corruption).
Remark. Heterogeneity in talent (Ai) and/or willingness to work (βi) generates en-
dogenous variation in the ￿fair￿ levels of income. From a normative perspective, we may
debate endlessly about what source of income variation should be consider ￿fair￿ and what
should be treated as ￿unfair￿. For instance, diﬀerences in Ai may be related to family
environment, home location, etc.; and willingness to work βi may be aﬀected by physical
characteristics (more resistance to fatigue or stress). Our results, however, survive as long
as there is both a ￿fair￿ and an ￿unfair￿ component in income inequality.20 Moreover, our
speci￿cation seems most appropriate from a positive perspective, to the extent we think of
20See also Section 5, and in particular 5.4, where we examine how diﬀerencies in family history and
parental investment can be treated partly as ￿fair￿ and partly as ￿luck￿.
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variation in Ai and βi as ex ante heterogeneity and variation in ηi as ex post heterogeneity.
Risk-averse agents would agree ex ante on a social institution that moderates the eﬀect
of ex post heterogeneity, but not the eﬀect of ex ante heterogeneity, and our speci￿cation
appears to proxy exactly such a social norm. Moreover, to the extent that diﬀerences
in talent and ability re￿ect diﬀerences in past investment choices, redistributing across
diﬀerent levels of talent and ability would involve important eﬃciency losses, which may
explain why it is ￿fair￿ to reward such diﬀerences.
3.3 The Government
The government chooses the tax rate τ and the level of redistribution or spending G,
subject to the following budget constraint:
G ≤
Z
i
τyi = τEyi. (7)
We assume that the policy is chosen with one person one vote rule and the median voter
theorem holds. There will be two motivation for redistribution. One is to partly correct
for the eﬀect of luck on income because of the demand for fairness. The second one, in
the event that the median of the population is poorer than the mean, is the standard
￿sel￿sh￿ redistribution a la Meltzer and Richard (1981).
4 The Politico-economic Equilibrium
The general equilibrium of the economy is naturally de￿ned as:
De￿nition 1 An equilibrium is a tax rate τ and a collection of individual plans {ki,e i}i∈[0,1]
such that (i) the plan (ki,e i) maximizes the utility of agent i for every i, and (ii) the tax
rate τ maximizes the utility of the median voter.
Using (2), (6) and (7), (5) reduces to
Ω = E
Z
{[(1 − τ)yi + τEyi] − b yi}
2 . (8)
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Suppose that yi − b yi is independent of b yi; this will turn to be true in equilibrium if and
only if luck ηi is independent of talent Ai and willingness to work or patience βi, which
we assume for simplicity. Then, from (8) we obtain social injustice as a weighted average
of the ￿variance decomposition￿ of income inequality:
Ω = τ
2Va r(b yi)+( 1− τ)
2Va r(yi − b yi). (9)
Note that the weights depend on the level of redistribution, namely τ. If minimizing
Ω were the only purpose of taxation, and the income distribution were exogenous, the
equilibrium tax rate would be given simply by:
1 − τ
τ
=
Va r (b yi)
Va r(yi − b yi)
. (10)
The right-hand side represents a kind of signal-to-noise ratio in the income distribution;
and as the goal of redistribution is to eliminate the eﬀect of noise on income inequality,
the optimal tax rate is decreasing is this signal-to-noise ratio. However, the income
distribution and the corresponding signal-to-noise ratio are endogenous in the economy,
as they depend on the investment and eﬀort choices made by all agents, which we now
examine.
4.1 Investment and eﬀort choice
Consider the investment and eﬀort decisions of agent i.H e c h o o s e s ki and ei so as to
maximize
ui =( 1− τ)Ai[αki +( 1− α)ei]+G −
α
2βi
k
2
i −
(1 − α)
2βi
e
2
i − γΩ, (11)
taking τ,G,and Ω as given. Since agents choose ki beforeτ is ￿xed, ￿rst-period investment
is a function of the anticipated tax rate and is sunk when the actual tax rate is chosen. On
the other hand, agents choose second-period eﬀort ei ex post, contingent on the realized
tax and the investment the made before. To distinguish the anticipated tax rate from the
realized one, we henceforth denote the former by τ and the latter by τ. Of course, τ = τ
in any perfect-foresight equilibrium, but we adopt the diﬀerent notation for the shake of
clarity.
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The ￿rst order conditions with respect to ki and ei imply
ki =( 1− τ)βiAi and ei =( 1− τ)βiAi. (12)
Substituting into (6), we conclude
b yi =[ 1− ατ − (1 − α)τ]δi, (13)
where δi ≡ βiA2
i. Therefore, exogenous heterogeneity in either talent (Ai) or impatience
and laziness (βi) translates to endogenous heterogeneity in investment and eﬀort (ki,e i)
and thereby in the fair component of income (b yi), Moreover, and an increase in the tax
rate distorts incentive and thereby reduces fair and actual income.
4.2 The median voter and the optimal tax
Consider an arbitrary agent i. From (2) and (13),
ci =( 1− τ)yi + τEy =( 1− τ)ηi +[ α(1 − τ)+( 1− α)(1 − τ)][δi + τ(Eδ − δi)].
From (4) and (12),
φ(ki,e i)=
1
2
£
α(1 − τ)
2 +( 1− α)(1 − τ)
2¤
δiβi
Substituting the above into (3), we conclude that equilibrium utility is given by
ui =( 1− τ)ηi +
1
2
£
1 − ατ
2 − (1 − α)τ
2¤
δi +[ 1− ατ − (1 − α)τ]τ(Eδ − δi) − γΩ. (14)
On the other hand, social injustice is
Ω = τ
2Va r(b yi)+( 1− τ)
2Va r(ηi). (15)
Va r (ηi), which measures the contribution of luck, is exogenous, but Va r(b yi), which mea-
sures the contribution of talent, eﬀort and investment, is endogenous. Using (13) we
obtain:
Va r(b yi)=[ 1− ατ − (1 − α)τ]
2Va r(δi).
Therefore, equilibrium social injustice is given by
Ω = τ
2[1 − ατ − (1 − α)τ]
2σ
2 +( 1− τ)
2v
2 (16)
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where σ2 ≡ Va r (δi) ≡ Va r(βiA2
i) and v2 ≡ Va r (ηi).
From (14) and (5), it follows that ui is single-picked in τ and the τ that maximizes ui
is a decreasing function of δi a n da ni n c r e a s i n gf u n c t i o no fηi. For simplicity, assume that
the distribution of ηi is symmetric and a law of large numbers holds with respect to ηi for
any δi. The median-voter theorem then applies with respect to δi and the median voter
corresponds to an agent i such that δi = δm and ηi =0 , where δm denotes the median of
the distribution of δi.
Following (14), the utility of the median voter is given by
um = κ −
1
2
(1 − α)τ
2δm +[ 1− ατ − (1 − α)τ]τ(Eδ − δm) − γΩ, (17)
where κ ≡ (1 − ατ2)δm/2. Note that κ is perceived as a constant when τ is chosen,
meaning that the median voter does not internalize the adverse eﬀect of the tax rate on
past investment choices.21 On the other hand, the median voter does take into account
the distortion of contemporaneous eﬀort; this eﬃciency cost is re￿e c t e di nt h es e c o n d
term above. The third term in (17) is the net transfer the median voter receives from the
government, re￿ecting the fact that a positive tax rate eﬀectively redistributes from the
mean to the median of the income distribution. This term introduces a ￿sel￿sh￿ motive
for redistribution, as in Meltzer and Richard (1981), whereas the last term captures an
￿altruistic￿ motive for redistribution, originating in the social concern for fairness.
In order to focus on the implications of fairness, in the remainder of this section we
restrict δm = Eδi, so that the mean and the median of the income distribution coincide.
We extend our results to the more general case, δm < Eδi, in Section 4.4. Normalizing
then δm =2 , the median voter￿s utility reduces to
um = κ − (1 − α)τ
2 − γΩ, (18)
with Ω given by (16).
T h ee xp o s t￿ o p t i m a l ￿t a xr a t eτ maximizes the utility of the median voter, um, taking
t h ee xa n t ea n t i c i p a t e dt a xr a t eτ as given. It follows:
21In other words, we have assumed that the median voter lacks commitment. We explain why this a
reasonable assumption in 4.5.
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Lemma 1 Let σ>0 measure the exogenous variation in talent, patience, or willingness
to work, v>0 the exogenous amount of pure luck, γ ≥ 0 the desire for social justice, and
α ∈ (0,1) the portion of income that is sunk when the tax rate is voted. Suppose that the
mean and the median of the income distribution coincide and de￿ne
f(τ) ≡ arg min
τ∈[0,1]
©
τ
2 £
(1 − α)+( γσ
2)(1− ατ − (1 − α)τ)
2¤
+( 1− τ)
2(γv
2)
ª
(19)
f represents the best-response function of the median voter against market expectations.
That is, when the ex-ante anticipated tax rate is τ,the ex-post optimal tax rate is τ = f(τ).
If γ =0 ,f (τ)=0for all τ ∈ [0,1].I fi n s t e a dγ>0, the optimal tax is f(τ) > 0 for all
τ ∈ [0,1] and is decreasing in σ and increasing in v and α.
The intuition is simple. If there were no concern about fairness (γ =0 ) , the optimal
tax is zero, as redistribution has only costs and no bene￿ts from the perspective of the
median voter (who is also the mean agent). When instead the society desires fair economic
outcomes (γ>0), the optimal tax will trade less eﬃciency for more fairness. If there is
a concern for fairness, then society chooses a positive level of redistribution in order to
correct for the eﬀect of ￿luck￿ on income inequality. As σ increases, more of the observed
income variation is due to luck, and the higher is the optimal tax rate. The opposite
consideration holds for larger v, as this implies more income variability due to ability
and eﬀort. The relationship between the ex-ante anticipated tax rate (τ) and the ex-post
optimal rate (τ) is generally non-monotonic. In fact an increase in τ has an unambiguous
adverse eﬀect on the fairness of the income distribution, as it distorts investment, but an
increase in τ has two opposite eﬀects. On the one hand, like in the case of τ, ah i g h e r
τ reduces the ￿fair￿ component of income variation, as it distorts eﬀort. On the other
hand, a higher τ redistributes more from the poor to the rich and may thus ￿correct￿ for
the eﬀect of luck. When τ is small, the second eﬀect dominates; τ increases with τ in
order to expand redistribution and thus ￿correct￿ for the relatively larger eﬀect of luck.
When instead τ is high, the ￿rst eﬀect dominates; τ falls with τ in order to encourage
more eﬀort and thus ￿substitute￿ for the adverse eﬀect of a higher τ.
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4.3 General equilibrium
From (13), the ￿signal-to-noise￿ ratio in the income distribution is given by
Va r(b yi)
Va r(ηi)
=[ 1− ατ − (1 − α)τ]
2σ2
v2 (20)
and is decreasing in the anticipated tax rate as long as part of income is sunk when the
tax is chosen (that is, α>0). On the other hand, minimizing social injustice Ω can be
interpreted as minimizing the eﬀect of ￿noise￿ on consumption variation. The ex post
optimal tax is thus higher the lower the higher the signal-to-noise ratio in the income
distribution. It is this interaction between the signal-to-noise ratio that the tax rate that
opens the door to multiple equilibria.
In any equilibrium, expectations must be validated; the ex-post optimal and the ex-
ante anticipated tax rates must thus coincide. Following 1, we conclude:
Proposition 1 Suppose that the median and the mean coincide. An equilibrium is any
￿xed point τ = f(τ), where f is given by (19). If γ =0 , the unique equilibrium is τ =0 .
If instead γ>0, the tax rate is τ ∈ (0,1) in any equilibrium; the equilibrium is unique
when γ is suﬃciently small or when v/σ is either suﬃciently small or suﬃciently large;
but there are two stable equilibria (and one unstable) when γ is suﬃciently high and v/σ
takes moderate values.
Therefore, provided that part of the eﬀort and investment choices are sunk when
the tax rate is chosen and the society cares about the fairness of economic outcomes, the
economy is prone to multiple equilibria,22 unless the amount of exogenous heterogeneity in
talent and willingness to work is either too high (in which case only a low-tax equilibrium
survives) or too small (in which case only a high-tax equilibrium survives). The possibility
of multiple equilibria is easy to see when v/σ ≈ 0 and α ≈ 1, in which case both the
22In light of the recent critique by Morris and Shin (2000), one may worry that our multiplicity result
would break down if we were to relax the common-knowledge assumption and introduce idiosyncratic
noise in the observation of economic fundamentals. However, Angeletos, Hellwig and Pavan (2002) show
that, in coordination environments with endogenous policy, multiplicity survives in the form of ￿policy
traps￿. Besides, in the dynamic extension we consider in Section 6, the two tax regimes re-emerge as two
stable steady states of a unique equilibrium path, in which case the Morris-Shin critic is simply irrelevant.
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exogenous amount of luck and the ex-post cost of taxation are almost zero. There are
then two stable equilibria, one in which τ ≈ 0 and one in which τ ≈ 1.
Figure 2 illustrates an example of multiple equilibria. The solid curve depicts the
best-response function (19) for an economy in which γ =1 ,α=1 /2,σ=2 .5, and v =1
(meaning that, in the absence of taxation, 70% o ft h ei n c o m ev a r i a t i o nw o u l db ed u et o
diﬀerences in talent and eﬀort and 30% due to random luck, and that half of income is
predetermined when the tax is chosen). This curve has three intersection points with the
45o line, each corresponding to a diﬀerent politico-economic equilibrium. The two extreme
points (US and EU) correspond to stable equilibria, while the middle one corresponds to
an unstable one. In point EU, the anticipation of a high tax induces agents to exert little
eﬀort. This in turn implies that the bulk of income heterogeneity is due to luck and makes
it ex post optimal for society to undertake large redistribution programs by imposing high
taxes, thus vindicating initial expectations. In point US, instead, the anticipation of a
low tax induces agents to exert high eﬀort and implies that income variation is mostly the
outcome of heterogeneity in talent and eﬀort, which in turn makes a low tax self-sustained
in the political process.
As long as there is both a desire and a cost for redistribution, and the exogenous
amount of luck is neither too large nor too small as compared to exogenous heterogeneity
in talent, a high- and a low-tax regime are bound to coexist. On the other hand, if v/σ
was so large that the eﬀect of luck always dominated the eﬀect of talent and eﬀort in
shaping the income distribution, then only the high-tax regime would survive. Such a
situation is illustrated by the upper dashed line in Figure 2. And if γ, v/σ, or α were
very small, so that either there is no social desire for fairness, or there is no need for
redistribution, or the cost of taxation is too high, then only the low-tax regime would
survive. Such a situation is illustrated by the lower dashed lined in Figure 2.
Remark: Even in the cases that the equilibrium is unique, the politico-economic com-
plementarity we have identi￿ed in this paper introduces a multiplier eﬀect. That is, small
diﬀerences in fundamentals may result to large diﬀerences in equilibrium outcomes.
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4.4 Self-interested redistribution
We now allow the median of the income distribution to be lower than the mean, namely
δm < Eδ, and thus introduce a sel￿sh motive for redistribution, as in Meltzer and Richard
(1981).
Let ∆ ≡ Eδ − δm parametrize the distance between the mean and the median of the
pre-tax income distribution, which can be interpreted as a measure of pre-tax income
inequality. As before, normalize δm =2 . From (17), the median voter￿s utility is now
given by
um = κ − (1 − α)τ
2 − γΩ + τ[1 − ατ − (1 − α)τ]∆,
while social injustice is again given by (16). We conclude that the best-response function
for the median voter becomes
f(τ) ≡ argminτ∈[0,1]
©
τ2 £
(1 − α)+( γσ2)(1− ατ − (1 − α)τ)
2¤
+( 1− τ)2(γv2)
−τ[1 − ατ − (1 − α)τ]∆ }
(21)
The only diﬀerence from (19) is the last term, which captures the Meltzer-Richard eﬀect.
And again, a politico-economic equilibrium corresponds to any ￿xed point τ = f(τ).
Note that f(τ) increases with ∆ for any τ ∈ [0,1]. By implication, any stable ￿xed
point of f is locally increasing in ∆.T h i s r e ￿ects simply the fact that, the poorer the
median voter is relatively to the mean, the higher the incentive to redistribute. As ∆
increases, the optimal tax rate trades less of the public good (fairness) for more of the
private good (self-interest redistribution). When ∆ is suﬃciently large, so that the sel￿sh
motive dominates, or γ is close to zero, so that there is little concern for fairness, a unique
equilibrium survives. But otherwise, the possibility of multiple equilibria remains.
The above results highlight that there are two forces driving the equilibrium level of
redistribution: The absolute extent of income inequality (as measured by ∆)a n dt h es oc i a l
value attributed to the fairness of economic outcomes (as measured by γ). Provided that
the latter is suﬃciently strong, it is perfectly possible that the observed level of taxation is
lower in a country with more income inequality, even if there is no diﬀerence in underlying
fundamentals. Such an observation cannot be explained by a pure Meltzer-Richard model,
as in the absence of a social demand for fairness a unique equilibrium survives, in which
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redistributive eﬀort is higher the higher the income inequality.23
4.5 Comments
First, the two equilibria can easily be ranked from the perspective of the median voter,
namely the one with lower taxes is always superior: There are less distortions, more
investment, and more aggregate income; and the ex-post heterogeneity in income is due
relatively more to ability than to luck, a socially desirable outcome. The clear-cut Pareto
ranking is due to our assumption of risk neutrality. In fact, behind the veil of ignorance
(before learning either (Ai,βi) or ηi), the equilibrium with high redistribution might be
preferable if the idiosyncratic variation is suﬃciently large and agents are suﬃciently risk
averse. That is, if you do not know whether you will be born with high or low talent or
willingness to work, you may prefer to be born in Europe rather than the United States,
as the European regime provides more insurance against such genetic risk. In fact, an
extension considering risk aversion sheds additional lights on cross-Atlantic diﬀerences.
Equation (3) imposes that agents are risk neutral, but it is easy to introduce risk aversion.
For instance, we may re-specify preferences as ui = Ψ(ci − ϕ(ei,k i) − γΩ), where Ψ is a
strictly concave function. Once agent i knows (Ai,e i,η i), maximizing ui is equivalent to
maximizing ci − ϕ(ei,k i) − γΩ. The equilibrium analysis thus goes through exactly as
before. To rank the two equilibria behind the veil of ignorance, agents compare Eui =
EΨ(.), where the expectation is over the distribution of (Ai,e i,η i). The concavity of Ψ then
introduces risk aversion, and higher taxation provides more insurance against idiosyncratic
variation in either talent and willingness to work or random luck. If Ψ is suﬃciently
concave, and idiosyncratic risk is suﬃciently large, the European equilibrium will be
preferred to the American equilibrium. Diﬀerences in risk aversion across the Atlantic
may then provide additional explanatory power regarding the diﬀerences in welfare states.
Since Americans were immigrants, and self-selection of those who leave their country of
origin in search of ￿fortune￿ may favor the least risk averse people, it is reasonable to argue
that Americans may have been less risk averse and thus less prone to social insurance.
23For cross-country evidence which also gives little support for a pure Meltzer-Richards model of
redisitribution, see Perotti (1996).
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imply diﬀerent degrees of attitude toward risk in the two sides of the Atlantic. 24
Second, it is perfectly possible that the ￿good￿ equilibrium (i.e., what we labelled US)
has more inequality than the ￿bad￿ equilibrium (EU): If σ is high relative to v, Va r (yi)
and Va r(ci) will be larger in the ￿good￿ equilibrium, but the ￿variance decomposition￿
will be fairer. Thus, and contrary to the simple Meltzer-Richard model, one can have
more inequality and less redistribution in the United States relative to Europe.
Third, the agents in our model dislike unfair distribution, not inequality per se. Adding
a concern for inequality per se would increase the incentives to redistribute, but would
not aﬀect the qualitative nature of our results. In particular, taxation would be higher in
any equilibrium, but multiplicity would survive.25 On the other hand, if the voters cared
only about the overall level of inequality, and were indiﬀerent about the decomposition
of inequality between fair and unfair components, the multiplicity of equilibria would
disappear all together. This, in fact, would be true both in the case that the mean and
median coincide, and in the case that the median is poorer than the mean.
Fourth, our paper could oﬀer some new insights on the normative and positive analysis
of taxation. Consider, for example, the taxation of capital. On the one hand, fairness
introduces an additional incentive for taxing capital income, to the extent that variation
in investment and returns re￿ects the eﬀect of ￿luck￿. On the other hand, while in
a representative-agent economy it is ex post optimal to impose the maximum possible
capital levy once capital is sunk, a fairness concern in a heterogeneous-agent economy
limits the ex post optimal tax, to the extent that variation in investment and returns
re￿ects the eﬀect of talent, entrepreneurship, and past hard work. In other words, a social
preference for fairness may aﬀect both the characterization and the time inconsistency of
optimal ￿scal policy.
Fifth, our analysis highlights the importance of the distinction between ex ante and ex
post heterogeneity. When agents are risk averse, the anticipation of ex post heterogeneity
(like what we call ￿luck￿) generates endogenously a demand for redistribution as a form of
24See Alesina, Glaeser and Sacerdote (2001) and the references cited therein for more discussion of the
question of attitudes and self selection.
25The relationship between changes in inequality and tax levels would then be more complex, an issue
addressed in Galasso (2002).
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risk sharing. But ex ante heterogeneity (like what we call ￿innate talent￿ or ￿willingness
to work￿) may signi￿cantly limit the levels of redistribution that are socially preferable
or politically sustainable. In other words, if individuals are risk averse and expect un-
certainty (￿luck￿) in their lives, but also diﬀer in their talent, patience, or willingness to
work, all individuals will favor insurance against luck, but not all individuals will favor
redistribution across diﬀerent levels of talent or eﬀort. Moreover, to the extent that talent
and ability re￿ects past investment decisions, such as education or entrepreneurship, re-
distributing across diﬀerent levels of talent and ability involves important eﬃciency losses.
However, both the distinction between ex ante and ex post heterogeneity and the accu-
mulation of human capital are absent from the recent research in the Mirrlees paradigm
of optimal taxation and social insurance. We believe that such considerations may, not
only generate endogenously the kind of fairness preferences that we took for granted in
this paper, but also produce further important insights.
Finally, it is unrealistic to think that an economy could ￿jump￿ from one tax regime to
another by simply revising equilibrium expectations from one day to another. In the next
section, we consider a dynamic extension, in which the two regimes emerge as multiple
steady states. History then plays an important role in determining what beliefs the
society holds and what redistributive policies it selects. Similarly, while only the low-tax
regime would survive in the static economy if the society could credibly commit on its
tax and redistributive policies before agents make their early-in-life investment and eﬀort
decisions, such commitment will be of little value in the dynamic economy, when wealth
and income are largely determined by family history.
5 Intergenerational Transfers and History Dependence
One important determinant of wealth and success in life is being born in a wealthy family.
In order to explore this issue, we now introduce intergenerational wealth transfers and
parental investment (e.g., bequests, education, status, etc.) that link individual income
to family history and birth.26 In order to concentrate on beliefs about the history of
26For a recent discussion of the intergenerational transfer of wealth and its eﬀect on eﬀort choices and
entrepreneurship, see Caselli and Gennaioili (2002).
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the wealth distribution rather than expectations about future taxation, we abstract from
investment choices made within a generation before the tax is set, and thus shut down
t h es o u r c eo fm u l t i p l es e l f - f u l ￿lling equilibria that we had in the benchmark static model.
The optimal rate of taxation and redistribution is now uniquely determined for any given
generation, but it depends on the whole history of the decomposition of wealth.
5.1 The environment
Consider an economy of non-overlapping generations indexed by t ∈ {..,−1,0,1,...}. Each
generation lives for one period. Within each generation, there is a single eﬀort choice,
made after the tax is voted on. Parents enjoy utility for leaving a bequest to their children;
by ￿bequests￿ we mean, not only monetary transfers, but also all other sorts of parental
investment.27 Let ci
t denote the consumption of family i in generation t,a n dki
t the bequest
the family leaves to the next generation. In the benchmark model, k denoted the eﬀort
or investment made by the individual himself early in his life; now k instead denotes
the bequest or parental investment of made by the individual￿s family. The use of the
same notation is not accidental; it emphasizes that, in either case, k corresponds to the
component of wealth that is ￿xed when the tax is chosen, whereas e corresponds to the
component of wealth that is determined after the tax is set. Preferences are now given by
u
i
t = U
i(c
i
t,k
i
t,e
i
t,Ωt)=V (c
i
t,k
i
t) −
1
β
i
t
ϕ(e
i
t) − γΩt. (22)
The ￿rst term represents the utility from consumption and bequests, the second term is
the disutility of eﬀort, and the last term captures the demand for fairness. As in the
benchmark model, β
i
t parametrizes ￿laziness￿ and ϕ is quadratic:
ϕ(e
i
t)=
1
2
(e
i
t)
2.
For simplicity, we also assume a Cobb-Douglas aggregator over consumption and bequests:
V (c
i
t,k
i
t)=
1
(1 − α)1−ααα
¡
c
i
t
¢1−α (k
i
t)
α. (23)
27This is of course a short cut, which is easier to model than adding the utility function of the children
into that of the parents.
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The constant (1 − α)1−ααα is just an innocuous normalization. As the fraction of wealth
allocated to bequests will turn to equal α, the coeﬃcient α can be interpreted as an
intergenerational discount factor.
The budget constraint for household i in generation t is given by
c
i
t + k
i
t ≤ (1 − τt)y
i
t + Gt, (24)
while the budget constraint for the government is
Gt = τt
Z
i
y
i
t. (25)
Pre-tax income (or wealth) is now given by the sum of eﬀort, luck, and parental invest-
ment:
y
i
t = A
i
te
i
t + η
i
t + k
i
t−1. (26)
Ai
t represents, as before, innate talent, which is independent of family history. To the
extent that productivity re￿ects child-rearing, education, and other shorts of parental
investment, we capture its eﬀect on income through ki
t−1,n o tAi
t.28 Finally, ηi
t is again
i.i.d. noise, which captures exogenous luck within the life of the agent.
5.2 Market outcomes and social injustice
Household i in generation t chooses consumption, bequest, and eﬀort (ci
t,k i
t,e i
t) so as to
maximize utility (22) subject to the budget constraint (24), taking political and social
outcomes (τt,Ωt) as given. Therefore, the optimal consumption and bequests are
c
i
t =( 1− α)
£
(1 − τt)y
i
t + τtyt
¤
, (27)
k
i
t = α
£
(1 − τt)y
i
t + τtyt
¤
, (28)
while the optimal eﬀort is
e
i
t =( 1− τt)A
i
tβ
i
t. (29)
28Introducing a production complementarity between parental investment, ki
t−1, and individual eﬀort,
ei
t, would complicate the algebra, but would not alter our qualitative ￿ndings.
27A. Alesina and G.M. Angeletos
Since wealth depends on parental investment (bequests) from the previous generation,
and bequests in turn depend on contemporaneous wealth, the wealth of any given indi-
vidual depends on the level of eﬀort and the realization of luck, not only during his own
lifetime, but also along his whole family tree. We thus need to adjust our measures of
fair outcomes and social injustice for the propagation of luck through intergenerational
transfers. In the absence of taxation, iterating (26) and (28) backward would give
y
i
t =( A
i
te
i
t + η
i
t)+k
i
t−1 = (30)
=( A
i
te
i
t + η
i
t)+α(A
i
t−1e
i
t−1 + η
i
t−1)+αk
i
t−2 = ... =
=
X
s≤t
α
s−tA
i
se
i
s +
X
s≤t
α
s−tη
i
s.
Assuming that bequests and parental investments are considered fair only to the extent
that they re￿ect eﬀort and talent, not pure luck or undeserved privileges, the ￿fair￿ level
of wealth is the cumulative eﬀect of eﬀort and talent,
b y
i
t ≡
X
s≤t
α
s−tA
i
se
i
s, (31)
while the residual
y
i
t − b y
i
t =
X
s≤t
α
s−tη
i
s (32)
represents the cumulative eﬀect of luck throughout the family￿s history. The fair level of
wealth would result to fair levels of consumption and bequests equal to b ci
t =( 1− α)b yi
t
and b ki
t = αb yi
t, which in turn would imply a fair level of utility from consumption and
bequests equal to V (b ci
t,b ki
t). The actual level of utility from consumption and bequests is
instead V (ci
t,k i
t). Our measure of social injustice is now the distance between actual and
fair levels of utility from consumption and bequests:29
Ωt = E
Z n
V (c
i
t,k
i
t) − V (b c
i
t,b k
i
t)
o2
. (33)
By (27) and (28), V (ci
t,ki
t)=( 1−τt)yi
t+τ(Eyi
t) and similalry V (b ci
t,b ki
t)=b yi
t. Therefore,
social injustice is equivalently the distance between actual disposable income and fair
29An alternative speci￿cation that gives identical results is Ωt = E
R n
[ci
t + ki
t] − [b ci
t + b ki
t]
o2
. Including
the disutility of eﬀort would also not alter our results.
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income, exactly like in the benchmark model (see condition (8)). By (29) and (31), fair
income is
b y
i
t =
X
s≤t
α
s−tA
i
se
i
s =
X
s≤t
α
s−t(1 − τs)δ
i
s, (34)
where δ
i
t ≡ β
i
t(Ai
t)2. Hence, the signal-to-noise ratio in the income distribution is now
given by
Va r(b yi
t)
Va r(yi
t − b yi
t)
=
Va r
¡P
s≤t αs−t(1 − τs)δ
i
s
¢
Va r
¡P
s≤t αs−tηi
s
¢ (35)
a n di si nt u r nd e c r e a s i n gi np a s tt a xr a t e s .F i n a l l y ,a s s u m i n gt h a tδ
i
t and ηi
t are uncorre-
l a t e dw i t he a c ho t h e r ,w h i c he n s u r e st h a tb yi
t and yi
t − b yi
t are also uncorrelated with each
other, we obtain
Ωt = τtVa r(b y
i
t)+( 1− τt)Va r (y
i
t − b y
i
t). (36)
The above is identical to condition (9) in the benchmark static model; once again it implies
that the optimal tax rate is bound to be a decreasing function of the signal-to-noise ratio
in the income distribution.
5.3 Multiple steady states
We look for ￿x e dp o i n t ss u c ht h a t ,i fτs = τ for all generations s ≤ t − 1, then τt = τ is
optimal for generation t. T os i m p l i f yw ea s s u m et h a tδ
i
t ≡ β
i
t(Ai
t)2 and ηi
t are i.i.d. across
both i and t,a n dl e tVa r(δ
i
t)=σ2 and Va r(ηi
t)=v2 for all i,t. Suppose τs = τ for all
s ≤ t − 1. The signal-to-noise ratio in generation t reduces to
Va r(b yi
t)
Va r(yi
t − b yi
t)
=[ 1− ατ − (1 − α)τt]
2 σ2
v2. (37)
This is identical to the analogous condition (20) in the benchmark model, with only τ
now representing an average of past tax rates rather than the ex-ante anticipated con-
temporaneous tax rate. To abstract from the Meltzer-Richard motive for redistribution,
we again assume δm = Eδ. Normalizing Eδ =2 ( 1− α), we can show that the utility of
the median voter in generation t reduces to
u
m
t = κ − (1 − α)τ
2
t − γΩt,
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where κ ≡ 2α(1−τ)+(1−α).κis historically given for generation t and the second term
represents the eﬃciency cost of taxation. Substituting Ωt and maximizing with respect
to τt, we conclude:
Lemma 2 Let σ>0 measure the exogenous variation in genetic talent or willingness
to work, v>0 the exogenous amount of pure luck, γ ≥ 0 t h ed e s i r ef o rs o c i a lj u s t i c e ,
and α ∈ (0,1) the relative importance of intergenerational transfers in shaping the wealth
distribution. Suppose that the mean and the median of the income distribution coincide
and de￿ne
f(τ) ≡ argmin
τ
©
τ
2 £
(1 − α)+( γσ
2)(1− ατ − (1 − α)τ)
2¤
+( 1− τ)
2(γv
2)
ª
.
f(τ) represents the best-response function of a given generation against a stationary his-
tory. That is, when all previous generations have chosen τ,the optimal tax for the current
generation is τ = f(τ).
Comparing the above with Lemma 1, we see that the functional form of f is identical
to that in the benchmark model. Therefore, our earlier result of multiple equilibria in
the static economy directly translate to a result of multiple steady states in the dynamic
economy:
Proposition 2 Suppose that the median and the mean coincide. A steady state is any
￿xed point τ = f(τ). If γ =0 , the unique steady state is τ =0 . If instead γ>0, the tax
rate is τ ∈ (0,1) in any steady state; the steady state is unique when γ is suﬃciently small
or when v/σ is either suﬃciently small or suﬃciently large; but there are two stable steady
states (and one unstable) when γ is suﬃciently high and v/σ takes moderate values.
Therefore, the example of Figure 2 can be directly reinterpreted in the context of a
dynamic economy with intergenerational transfers, provided we read τ as the tax rate in
s o m eg i v e ng e n e r a t i o na n dτ as a weighted average of tax rates in all past generations.
Multiple steady states again exist when the social desire for fairness is suﬃciently high
and the relative eﬀect of luck takes moderate values. The two extreme intersection points,
US and EU, correspond to the two stable steady states. Diﬀerent initial conditions, or
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diﬀerent exogenous aggregate shocks, would lead the economy to converge to either of
these two steady states. US is characterized by lower taxation, lower distortions, and
fairer outcomes as compared to EU.
Income inequality and social mobility can be higher in either steady state. Nonetheless,
both inequality and mobility are mostly the eﬀect of eﬀort in US and mostly the eﬀect
of luck in EU. Moreover, mobility and inequality need not be tightly related with each
other. It is quite possible that the superior steady state (US) is associated with higher
inequality and yet higher social mobility. This will indeed be the case if the within-family
cross-generation variation in talent or willingness to work is suﬃciently large, for then
mobility will be mostly the eﬀect of diﬀerences in eﬀort and productivity in US,w h e r e a s
it will be mostly the eﬀect of luck in EU.
5.4 Equalizing opportunities for children
In writing (31), we assumed that the society wishes to correct the cumulative eﬀect of
pure luck, but otherwise parents are fully entitled to make diﬀerent transfers to their
children deriving from diﬀerent levels of eﬀort. However, the society may not want to
keep children born by unworthy parents responsible for their parents￿ laziness and lack of
care. There is then a con￿ict between what is considered fair vis-a-vis parents and what
is considered fair vis-a-vis children. As a result, the society may like to make parents
only partly entitled to leaving diﬀerent bequests to their children, even if these diﬀerences
re￿ect diﬀerent levels of eﬀort or parental care, so as to further equalize opportunities
across children.
This possibility is easy to incorporate in our model, as follows. Let λ ∈ (0,1) be the
fraction of eﬀort-driven parental bequests that children are entitled to; that is, the ￿fair￿
level of wealth is
b y
i
t ≡ A
i
te
i
t + λ
X
s≤t−1
α
s−tA
i
se
i
s.
1 − λ can be interpreted as a measure of the social desire for equalizing opportunities
across children. The analysis goes through as before, with simply replacing α with αλ.
Assuming again that the mean and the median coincide, and normalizing Eδ =2 ( 1−αλ),
we conclude that the optimal tax rate in generation t when past generations have chosen
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τ is given by τt = f(τ),w h e r e
f(τ) ≡ argmin
τ
©
τ
2 £
(1 − αλ)+( γσ
2)(1− αλτ − (1 − αλ)τ)
2¤
+( 1− τ)
2(γv
2)
ª
.
It follows that the possibility of multiple steady states remains as long as λ is not very
small. Moreover, the tax rate in any (stable) steady state is decreasing in λ; that is,
redistribution increases with a higher desire to equalize opportunities across children.
Remark. We have considered only one kind of taxation and redistribution, namely
income taxation coupled with lump sum transfers. Diﬀerent redistributive goals given a
desire for fairness could be achieved by using a mixture of diﬀerent tax and redistribution
instruments. For example, we can introduce an inheritance tax in addition to the income
tax. A society may then consider an inheritance more or less ￿fair￿ depending on whether
higher bequests are or are not due to higher ability and eﬀort by the previous generation.
Similarly, one could consider public provision of education. Our model would predict
that, in an attempt to correct for the more unfair variation in children￿s opportunities,
Europe adopts a larger government intervention in education.
6C o n c l u s i o n
More Americans than Europeans think that the poor are lazy (or at least lazier than the
rich); and fewer Europeans than Americans think that market outcomes are fair. We ar-
gue that in their attempt to improve the fairness of economic outcomes, Europeans choose
more redistribution and more government intervention which, in equilibrium, distorts mar-
ket allocations, increases the eﬀect of luck, and makes economic outcomes unfair. This
in turn, vindicates the Europeans￿ beliefs and justi￿es their policy choices. The opposite
occurs in the United States, where lower distortions imply a more fair income distrib-
ution and therefore less need for redistribution.30 These considerations help explaining
why income inequality is higher in the United States than in continental Europe, and
nevertheless redistributive policies are much more limited. A diﬀerent way of saying this
30It is worth mentioning an interesting diﬀerence with respect to Benabou and Tirole (2002). In their
model it is mostly an ￿illusion￿ that in American eﬀort is more important than in Europe, while in our
model it is a fully rational belief.
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is that Europeans favor redistribution because they (correctly) perceive income inequality
as largely the eﬀect of luck, whereas Americans are willing to tolerate inequality because
they (also correctly) perceive it as largely justi￿ed.31
Interestingly, the biggest diﬀerences in redistributive policies between the United
States and continental Europe reside in the support for poverty per se. That is, if you are
sick, old, or disabled, have dependent children, or have suﬀered an accident at work, you
do get substantial support in the United States; but if you are merely poor, you do not get
much support in the United States.32 This stylized fact is exactly what our model would
predict if we allowed two kinds of ￿luck￿, observed and unobserved. Since accidents at
work, sickness, and disability are mostly beyond the control of the individual and are eas-
ily observed and veri￿ed by society, the social desire to correct for their eﬀect on income
and consumption should be equally strong in the United States and in Europe. Poverty,
on the other hand, can be the outcome of unobserved choice (lack of eﬀort) rather than
exogenous luck. If this is more the case in the United States than in Europe, support for
poverty will indeed be lower in the United States.
We have focused on income taxation and redistribution, but the demand for fairness
may have similar implications for many other policy choices as well. Consider, for example,
the regulation of the labor market. Unemployment can be the outcome of either bad luck
(e.g., ineﬃc i e n tm a t c h )o rl a c ko fe ﬀort (e.g., low job search while unemployed, or high
shrinking while employed). If ￿everybody who is willing to work deserves a job￿ and the
society must protect anybody who is ￿unjustly￿ laid-oﬀ, two politico-economic regimes
may emerge: One in which extensive employment protection, generous unemployment
bene￿ts, low turn over, and high unemployment rates reinforce each other (￿Europe￿),
and another in which limited regulation and eﬃcient allocations are self-sustained as well
(￿United States￿). Moreover, if the exogenous component of short-term unemployment is
larger than that of long-term unemployment, the model would predict that American and
European policies diverge with respect to long-term unemployment support but converge
with respect to short-term unemployment support. This prediction is consistent with the
31We are of course not arguing that this is the only explanation. For an exhaustive discussion of
additional factors, see Alesina, Glaeser and Sacerdote (2001).
32See Alesina, Glaeser and Sacerdote (2001) for more detailed evidence.
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fact that the duration of bene￿ts is much shorter in the United States but the replacement
r a t i oi sa sh i g ha si nE u r o p e( s e eT a b l e3 ) .
This paper has shown how the complementarity between political and economic choices
that emerges in the presence of a concern for fairness can lead to multiple equilibria or
multiple steady states for the same ￿fundamentals￿. More generally, however, we can think
of this complementarity as an ampli￿cation and propagation mechanism, via which small
diﬀerences in fundamentals or initial conditions result to large and persistent diﬀerences
in political outcomes. This may relate to the diﬀerent historical experiences of the United
States and continental European countries. In Europe, due to its history, class diﬀerences
are more rooted and wealth more associated with privileges, which we can interpret as
￿luck￿ of being born in the right family. The ￿self-made man￿ is very much an American
￿idol￿; and aversion to nobility and birth-related privileges are deeply rooted in American
history, from its very beginning. At the time of the extension of the franchise in Europe,
the distribution of income was perceived as unfair because it was generated more by
birth and nobility than by ability and eﬀort. The unfairness of market outcomes has
hence been a strong argument for aggresive redistributive policies and other forms of
government intervention in Europe. In the ￿land of opportunities,￿ the perception was
instead that those who were successful and wealthy had ￿made it￿ on their own, at least
to a quite larger degree than in Europe. As a consequence, Americans have chosen low
redistribution, strong property protection, and limited regulation, resulting to much lower
ineﬃciencies and a much smaller eﬀect of ￿luck￿.
Exogenous ￿shocks￿ that may have also pushed the two sides of the Atlantic towards
diﬀerent politico-economic equilibria are the major wars of the last century. In Europe,
two disastrous wars fought in its territory created devastation and misery for a large
number of Europeans. The aftermath of the wars witnessed a major growth of socialist and
communist movements, with the natural implications in terms of redistributive policies,
viewed especially with vavor in these periods of devastation. The United States did not
loose a war, nor fought a war on its territory, nor experienced civilain deaths and domestic
devastation in any comparable magnitudes. 33
33Interestingly, as Skocpol (1992) discusses, the American Civil War prompted one of the few early
examples of social welfare programs in the US, namely veteran pensions.
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Finally, a word on welfare and regulation reforms in Europe. Since the ￿European￿
steady state is locally stable, small ￿shocks￿, such as incremental policy reforms, may
not be enough to move Europe away from the politico-economic regimes that sustains
the existing system. Only large, bold, and persistent reforms may switch the politico-
economic equilibrium to the one with low taxes, limited regulation, and more eﬃcient
outcomes. In practice, this means that a successful welfare reform needs to convince
people that market outcomes will eventually become more ￿fair￿ with lower taxes and
narrower government intervention.
Appendix: ￿Bad￿ eﬀort, not luck
We now consider the case in which the socially undesirable source of income inequality
is due to various kinds of socially unworthy activities, or ￿bad eﬀort￿, such as corruption,
rent seeking, etc. In order to focus on this new channel, in this section we abstract from
disutility of eﬀort and cost of investment.
The environment
The agent has one unit of time or capital during the ￿rst period of life, which he can
allocate in either ￿production￿ or ￿corruption and rent seeking.￿ We model productive
activities as in the previous section: If agent i allocates ki in production during the ￿rst
period of his life, he receives Aiki during the second period. ￿Rent seeking￿ or ￿corrup-
tion￿, on the other hand, represent activities which do not create any new social product
but merely aﬀect the distribution of a given social product among the diﬀerent agents
in the economy; they are a zero-sum game. Speci￿cally, if agent i allocates a fraction
(1 − ki) of his resources to corruption and rent seeking, then he receives
Ri =
·
zi −
Z
j
zj
¸
G, (38)
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where
zi ≡ [Bi (1 − ki)]
ψ /ψ. (39)
zi represents the level of rent-seeking activity by agent i and
R
j zj the aggregate rent
seeking in the economy. Bi measures the productivity of agent i in rent seeking, his
ability in negotiating with bureaucrats and lobbying with politicians, or his indiﬀerence
towards the morality of his own business life. ψ ∈ (0,1) introduces diminishing returns
in rent-seeking activities; we do so only to ensure an interior solution and, for simplicity,
we let ψ =1 /2. Since corruption is a zero-sum game,
R
j Ri =0 . Total income and
consumption for agent i are given by
yi = Aiki + Ri = Aiki +[ zi − Ezj]G, (40)
ci =( 1− τ)yi + G. (41)
The ￿fair￿ levels of consumption and income are:
b ci ≡ b yi ≡ Aiki = yi − Ri, (42)
Suppose that b yi and Ri are independent; which will be true in equilibrium if and only
if Ai and bi ≡ Bi/Ai are independent, which we assume for simplicity. Then:
Ω =
Z
i
(ci − b ci)
2 = τ
2Va r(b yi)+( 1− τ)
2Va r(Ri), (43)
By comparing the above with (15), it becomes clear that rents Ri in the present economy
p l a yt h es a m er o l et h a tl u c kηi played in the benchmark economy. Finally, the government
budget is
G = τ
Z
i
yi = Eyi, (44)
and individual preferences are given by
ui = ci − γΩ − (1 − α)τ
2. (45)
The last term captures any contemporaneous cost of taxation; we cut through the micro-
foundations only for the shake of expositional simplicity.
Equilibrium allocations, corruption, and redistribution
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The FOC with respect to ki reduces to34
1 − ki = Bi
µ
G
Ai
¶2
. (46)
It follows that zi =2 G(Bi/Ai) and Ezi =2 GE(Bi/Ai). Rent-seeking activity is thus
increasing with the size of government. Let bi ≡ Bi/Ai denote the relative productivity
of agent i in rent seeking and, without serious loss of generality, assume that bi and Ai
are independent. Using (46) together with (38), (40) and (41), we infer that income from
r e n ts e e k i n ga n df r o m￿ g o o d ￿e ﬀort is given by
Ri =2 G[bi − Ebi] and b yi = Ai − Gbi. (47)
It follows that ERi =0(re￿ecting the fact that corruption is a zero-sum game) and
Eyi = Eb yi = EAi − GEbi. Normalizing EAi = Ebi =1and using G = τEyi,w ei n f e rt h a t
aggregate output and the size of government are given by
Eyi =
1
1+τ
and G =
τ
1+τ
, (48)
where τ again denotes the anticipated tax rate. Note that the negative dependence of
aggregate output on the tax rate re￿ects not the usual tax distortion, as we have assumed
(only for simplicity) that total resources are in ￿xed supply, but rather the waste of
resources in rent seeking, which is proportional to the size of government.
From (47), the ￿variance decomposition￿ of income is Va r(Ri)=4 G2Va r(bi) and
Va r (b yi)=Va r(Ai)+G2Va r(bi). Letting σ2 ≡ Va r(Ai) and v2 ≡ Va r(bi), and substituting
G from (48), we conclude
Va r(b yi)
Va r(Ri)
=
1
4
+
·
1+
1
τ
¸2 σ2
v2. (49)
Therefore, as the incentives to engage in corruption and rent seeking are increasing in
the expected size of government, the ￿signal-to-noise ratio￿ in the income distribution
is decreasing in the anticipated tax rate. Note that this relation between the ￿variance
decomposition￿ of income inequality and the anticipated tax rate is isomorphic to that
34To avoid corner solutions for any agent, we assume that the parameters of the economy are such that,
in any equilibrium, Bi(G/Ai)2 < 1 for all i. This is obviously without any loss of generality.
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in the benchmark model. Now it re￿ects the eﬀect of corruption rather than luck, but
its implications for multiplicity are essentially the same. Two stable equilibria may again
arise. If agents anticipate a high tax rate, then they allocate a large portion of their
resources in corruption rather than production, as they anticipate the private bene￿ts of
the corruption game to be large. But then most of income heterogeneity is the outcome
of socially undesirable means, which in turn makes it optimal to impose a high tax rate
in an attempt to redistribute from the corrupt rich to the politically disadvantaged poor.
On the other hand, if agents anticipate a low tax, they allocate most of their resources in
production rather than consumption. In this case, most income heterogeneity is socially
desirable and the ex post optimal tax rate is small, once again vindicating agents￿ initial
expectations.
This version of the model implies that a ￿benevolent￿ government is trying to correct
some corruption that is present somewhere in the system. In a sense we are implic-
itly viewing government activities and interaction with the public as a combination of
benevolent and corrupt. A more cynical interpretation would be that some redistributive
programs are introduced to placate the electorate letting corruption run wild. But a de-
tailed modelling of corruption is beyond our scope here.35The contemporaneous presence
of corruption and redistribution may well capture the case of many developing countries,
even some OECD countries (e.g., Italy, Greece), in which the welfare state is not as eﬃ-
cient and well-functioning as that of other European countries. These are welfare states
in which redistributive programs are often mis-targeted, or favor special interests, and
attempts at correcting inequities end up creating even more injustice. In other words, in
the previous sections we considered a redistributive system in which redistributive ￿ows
were as well targeted as possible. In this section we have considered a case in which ￿scal
￿ows are a combination of favoritism and corruption in addition to an attempt at creating
more ￿fair￿ economic outcomes.
35For insightful models of corruption, see Shleifer and Vishny (1993), Tirole (1993), and Banarjee
(1997).
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from OECD Economic Outlook Database (No. 71, Vol. 2002, 
Release 01, June 2002). 
a. Totals also include interest payments and some categories of capital outlays. 
b. Includes social security. 
c. Simple average for Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, 
Norway, Portugal, Spain and Sweden. 
 
 
Table 1 
Composition of General Government Expenditure, 2000 (Percent of GDP) 
 
 
Consumption 
 
Country 
 
Total
a 
Goods and 
Services 
Wages and 
salaries  Subsidies
Social 
benefits 
and other 
transfers
b 
Gross 
investment
 
United  States  29.9  5.3 9.2 0.4 10.6  3.3 
Continental Europe
c  44.9  8.3 12.4 1.5 17.6  2.5 
      France  48.7  9.7 13.5 1.3 19.6  3.2 
   Germany  43.3  10.9  8.1  1.7  20.5  1.8 
      Sweden  52.2  9.8 16.4 1.5 20.2  2.2  
 
Table 2 
Government Expenditure on Social Programs, 1998 (Percent of GDP) 
 
Country Total 
Old-age, 
disability 
and 
survivors
a  Family
a
Unemployment 
and labor 
market 
programs Health
b  Other
c 
United States  14.6  7.0  0.5  0.4  5.9  0.9 
Continental Europe
d  25.5 12.7  2.3  2.7  6.1  1.7 
   France  28.8  13.7  2.7  3.1  7.3  2.1 
   Germany  27.3  12.8  2.7  2.6  7.8  1.5 
   Sweden  31.0  14.0  3.3  3.9  6.6  3.2 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the OECD Social Expenditure Database for 1980-1998 (3rd 
Edition, 2001). 
a. Includes cash benefits and in kind services. 
b. Includes, among other things, inpatient care, ambulatory medical services and pharmaceutical goods. 
c. Includes occupational injury and disease benefits, sickness benefits, housing benefits and expenditure on other 
contingencies (both in cash or in kind), including benefits to low-income households. 
d. Simple average for Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, 
Norway, Portugal, Spain and Sweden. 
 
 
  
Table 3 
Labor markets in the US and in Europe 
 
Country 
Labor 
standards 
1985-93 
Employment
protection 
1990 
Minimum 
annual leave
(weeks) 
1992 
Benefit 
replacement 
ratio (%) 
1989-94 
Benefit 
duration 
(years) 
1989-94 
France  6 14 5 57 3 
Germany  6 15 3 63 4 
Sweden  7 13 5 80  1.2 
Great Britain  0  7  0  38  4 
European Union
a  4.8 13.5 3.8 58.7 2.6 
United States  0  1  0  50  0.5 
 
Source: Reproduced from Alesina, Glaeser and Sacerdote (2001). Original sources: Nickell and Layard (1999) 
and Nickell (1997). The labor standard index is produced byt the OECD and extended by Nickell and Layard. It 
refers to the strenght of legislastion with regards to five different aspects fo the labor market:working hours, 
fixed terms contracts, employment protection and employees’ representation rights. The score ranges from 0 to 
10. Employment protection is measured by an OECD index referrring to the legal framework concerning hioring 
and firing restrictions (frome OECD Jobs Study 1994). The amximum value iks 20. Minimum annual leave is 
from the same OECD source and includes publc holidays. The benefit replacement ratio is the share of income 
replaced by unemployment benefits and it is from US Socuial Security Administration Socail Security Programs 
Troughout the World 1999. benfit duration si from the same source. 
a. European Union includes Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden and Great Britain. 
  
 
Table 4 
Effect of belief that luck determines income on total social spending  
(cross-country data) 
 
 
Source: Total social spending is social spending as a percentage of GDP, from Persson and Tebellini (2000); 
original source: IMF. Majoritarian, presidential, and age structure are from Persson and Tabellini (2002). Ethnic 
fractionalization is from Alesina et al (2002). Mean belief that luck determines income is constructed using 
World Value Survey data for 1981-97 from the Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan. This 
variable corresponds to the response to the following question: “In the long run, hard work usually brings a 
better life. Or, hard work does not generally bring success; it’s more a matter of luck and connections.” The 
answers are coded 1 to 10. We recoded on a scale 0 to 1, with 1 indicating the strongest belief in luck. 
Robust t statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Dependent variable: Total social spending 
  1 2 3 4 5 
Gini coefficient 
 -0.306
* 
(1.724) 
-0.238
* 
(1.739) 
-0.115 
(0.613) 
-0.041 
(0.347) 
Mean belief that luck 
determines income 
32.728
*** 
(2.925) 
32.272
*** 
(3.064) 
36.430
*** 
(3.305) 
31.782
** 
(2.521) 
13.758 
(1.345) 
Latin America 
-6.950
*** 
(3.887) 
-4.323 
(1.472) 
-2.992 
(0.941) 
0.413 
(0.098) 
2.344 
(0.832) 
Asia 
-9.244
*** 
(6.684) 
-6.075
** 
(2.153) 
-0.808 
(0.142) 
4.657 
(0.618) 
0.774 
(0.314) 
GDP per capita 
   3.148 
(1.348) 
4.754 
(1.548) 
-1.202 
(0.742) 
Population above 65 
     1 . 4 3 0
*** 
(3.833) 
Popu b/w 15 and 64 
     0 . 0 7 9  
(0.337) 
Majoritarian 
   0.493 
(0.184) 
0.031 
(0.011) 
 
Presidential 
    -4.24 
(1.392) 
 
Constant 
-3.088 
(0.590) 
7.907 
(1.396) 
-25.207 
(1.152) 
-41.401 
(1.425) 
-3.937 
(0.215) 
Observations 
Adjusted R-squared 
29 
0.431 
26 
0.494 
26 
0.495 
26 
0.496 
26 
0.7  
Table 5 
The effect of mean belief that luck determines income on social spending,  
excluding old age, disability and survivors’ benefits (cross-country data) 
 
Dependent variable: Social spending excluding old age, disability and survivors’ benenefits 
  1 2 3 
Gini coefficient 
-0.232 
(1.617) 
-0.014 
(0.129) 
-0.242
* 
(1.824) 
Mean belief that luck 
determines income 
29.817
** 
(2.552) 
22.085
* 
(2.026) 
27.686
** 
(2.317) 
GDP per capita 
7.156
*** 
(3.868) 
10.162
*** 
(5.893) 
7.005
** 
(2.811) 
Population above 65 
   0.529
* 
(1.857) 
Population 15-64 
   -0.631
* 
(1.832) 
Majoritarian 
-0.895 
(0.490) 
-1.85 
(1.143) 
 
Presidential 
 -6.924
*** 
(3.536) 
 
Constant 
-59.411
*** 
(3.057) 
-89.823
*** 
(5.394) 
-22.528 
(1.190) 
Observations  20 20 20 
Adjusted R-squared  0.511  0.644  0.609 
 
Source: The dependent variable reports authors’ calculations using data for 1980-1998 from the 
OECD Social Expenditure database. It is defined as the sum of occupational injury and sickness 
benefits, family cash benefits and services, active labor market programs expenditure, 
unemployment benefits, public health expenditures, housing benefits, other contingencies benefits. 
All other variables are as in Table 4. 
Robust t statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 Table 6 
The effect of individual belief that luck determines income on individual political orientation 
 
Dependent variable: Being left on the political spectrum 
  1 2  3 
US resident 
-0.428
*** 
(12.50) 
-0.468
*** 
(5.02) 
-0.354
*** 
(3.50) 
Income 
-0.031
*** 
(7.19) 
-0.038
*** 
(4.65) 
-0.039
*** 
(4.86) 
Years of education 
-0.013
*** 
(3.78) 
-0.003 
(0.43) 
0.005 
(0.76) 
City population 
0.032
*** 
(7.38) 
0.04
*** 
(4.89) 
0.03
*** 
(4.23) 
White 
0.109
*** 
(4.72) 
0.134
** 
(2.16) 
0.112
 
(1.88) 
Married 
-0.079
*** 
(3.20) 
-0.093
** 
(2.42) 
-0.104
*** 
(2.71) 
No. of children 
-0.03
*** 
(3.66) 
-0.041
*** 
(3.25) 
-0.046
*** 
(3.46) 
Female 
-0.135
*** 
(6.93) 
-0.109
*** 
(2.79) 
-0.09
** 
(2.57) 
Individual belief that luck 
determines income 
 
0.482
*** 
(8.61) 
0.512
*** 
(9.02) 
Gini Coefficient 
 
 
 
-2.562
*** 
(2.70) 
Age group 18-24 
0.352
*** 
(6.43) 
0.205
** 
(2.22) 
0.182
*** 
(1.96) 
Age group 25-34 
0.414
*** 
(11.77) 
0.321
*** 
(5.81) 
0.324
*** 
(5.93) 
Age group 35-44 
0.396
*** 
(12.00) 
0.389
*** 
(8.63) 
0.392
*** 
(8.32) 
Age group 45-54 
0.276
*** 
(8.18) 
0.242
*** 
(5.29) 
0.25
*** 
(5.15) 
Age group 55-64 
0.125
*** 
(3.59) 
0.08 
(1.60) 
0.077 
(1.42) 
Constant 
-0.392
*** 
(5.90) 
-0.761
*** 
(5.26) 
0.025 
(0.07) 
Observations 20269  12488  11514 
Pseudo R-squared  0.03  0.04  0.04 
 
Source: The dependent variable is a 0-1 indicator for whether the respondent classifies himself/herself as being 
on the left of the political spectrum. It is constructed using data from the World Value Survey. The question is 
formulated as follows: “In political matters, people talk of left and right. How would you place your views on 
this scale, generally speaking?” The respondent is given a scale 1 to 10, 1 being the most leftist. To avoid small 
differences, we transformed this score to a 0-1 indicator. We classified as leftist (indicator value 1) anyone who 
answered with a score of 5 or below and rightist (indicator value 0) anyone with a score of 6 or above. All other 
individual characteristics are also from World Value Survey. The table reports Probit estimates; OLS gives very 
similar results. 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 
Reproduced from Alesina, Gleaser and Sacerdote (2001). This scatterplot illustrates the positive 
cross-country correlation between the percentage of GDP allocated to social spending and the 
fraction of respondents to the World Value Survey who believe that luck determines income.  
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The above figure depicts the relation between the tax rate that agents anticipate ex ante, and the tax
rate that the society (median voter) finds optimal ex post. The solid curve represents an economy
where the exogenous noise (luck) in the income distribution is moderate as compared to the
exogenous heterogeneity in talent, patience, or willingness to work. A politico-economic equilibrium
corresponds to any intersection of this curve with the 45-degree line. In this case, there are two stable
equilibria, one with low injustice and low taxation (US), and one with high injustice and high taxation
(EU). The lower dashed line, on the other hand, represents an economy where the noise in the income
distribution is very small, the social desire for fairness is very week, or the cost of taxation is very
high. In this economy, only the low-tax regime survives. Finally, the upper dashed line represents an
economy where both the desire and the ability to redistribute are high, in which case only the high-tax
regime survives. 
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